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Petitioner, Rita C. Gum, acting as her own counsel, pro se, and 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 49, submit the following 
petition for wr i t of certiorari. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
Is this Decree of Divorce, given the Petitioner, invalid because the 
tr ial court judge disregarded the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and should 
i t be declared null and void by this Court? 
ORDERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This case was f i rs t appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals, on 
October 4, 1990, from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered on September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA. 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). 
The Court remanded the case for reconsideration: 
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support the court's finding *17 regarding costs and fees and 
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briggs v. 
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v. 
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those 
issues. If, having decided those issues, the court determines 
some adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution 
is in order, the court has the discretion to make such 
adjustments." 
The case was again appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals and on 
June 21 , 1993 the Court ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING was Dated July 20. 1993. 
JURIDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals entered i ts decision on June 21 , 1993. 
There was a petition for rehearing filed on July 7, 1993. An Order 
Denying Petition for Rehearing was dated July 20, 1993. A request for an 
extension of time to petition for certiorari was filed August 13, 1993 and 
an Order of extension of time was given up to and including September 18, 
1993, dated August 13, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction to review the 
Court of Appeals decision by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(2), (3) (a) and (5), and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 
45(a), (c). (Amended effective October 1, 1992. 
CONTROLLING LAW 
The Amended Decree of Divorce as determined by the Trial Court was 
clearly erroneous. 
Any certificate of readiness for trial which is served 
upon the opposing party and filed with the clerk of the court in 
which discovery is not complete prior to filing the certificate 
or in which discovery is not complete prior to pretrial 
conference may be stricken and the trial date, if assigned, may 
be vacated. Rule 4-104 (5). Code of Judicial Administration. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the matter 
of disqualification of a judge: 
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that 
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing 
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge 
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like 
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit [Emphasis added]. 
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Judge John A. Rokich did proceed further therein, before calling 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Lower Courts 
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact 
that the Petitioner did not have funds to move from her home on H Street, 
within 10 days, as the Court Ordered her to do. Substantial portions of the 
record deal with this issue and no provisions of funds were made available 
to help her move. 
At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and 
disjointed t r ia l proceeding, the t r ia l court allowed the Defendant and 
Respondent's attorney. Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should 
make the divorce invalid (p. 189 - Record on Appeal). 
On October 4, 1990, Rita f i led a Notice of Appeal (p. 207 -
Record on Appeal). No Cross-Appeal was fi led. 
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case for reconsideration. 
In the second tr ia l the Trial Court improperly forced the Petitioner 
to court to set a hearing before her Discovery was answered or her 
Aff idavit of Prejudice was ruled upon. 
The Petitioner did not appear at this hearing as she fel t that the 
Court had no right in law to set i t . The Trial Court proceeded wi th a 
hearing without the Petitioner present. The Court completely ignored the 
remand of The Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Court then ordered the Attorney for the Respondent to prepare a 
new Findings of Facts and Decree of Divorce. 
3 
The second appeal was from this final Decree of Divorce of the Third 
Judicial Distr ict Court entered on September 14, 1992. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Petitioner, Rita C. Gum, and Respondent, James Richard Gum, were 
married in March 1982. Their state of matrimony has continued for over 
ten (10) years. 
Factual statements are well covered in the two Briefs of Appellant 
and the two Reply Briefs of Appellant in two appeals and the petit ion for a 
rehearing, which she has f i led in this case. 
Petitioner from the time she took charge of the case when her last 
attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdrew has tried to get the Honorable John A. 
Rokich to follow the Utah Code of Civil Procedure and receive her due 
process of law. Constitution of Utah, Art icle 1, Section 7. It is d i f f icu l t 
for the Petitioner to understand the prejudiced position of Judge Rokich 
even to the point of not abiding the law in a divorce case. She has pointed 
out these errors in her f i l ings wi th the court and in person, but they 
remain uncorrected. To do so would serve justice as i t should be. Why did 
the judge disobey the law in this case? Prejudice implies a preformed 
judgment even more unreasoning than bias, and usually implies more 
unreasoning than bias, and usually implies an unfavorable opinion. 
At the original t r ia l the Honorable John A. Rokich made many biased 
and prejudiced statements to this Petitioner which she brought to issue, 
in her Briefs before the Utah Court of Appeals as shown in and off the 
record. This bias was unjust and resulted in actions that constituted a 
clear abuse of discretion and that he is so deeply prejudiced she could not 
have a fa i r or impartial hearing or t r ia l before him. This was the main 
reason for the appeals; the Court not abiding the law. 
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Upon remand of the case to the District Court by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the Petitioner filed an Affidavit of Prejudice. There were 
months of delay while Judge Rokich did not act upon this Affidavit. 
The trial could not legally proceed until this matter was resolved, 
as required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
While waiting on this matter, the Petitioner filed REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on June 10, 1991. The case could not be ready 
for trial until the discovery was completed. 
The Respondent filed CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL in 
September, 1991, stating,"... that opposing counsel have had reasonable 
time to pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has been 
completed." The Discovery for the Petitioner was never completed by the 
Respondent. The counsel for the Respondent was also delaying the case. 
The Respondent filed OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS, OCTOBER 17, 1991. Which was never acted upon by the judge. 
There were now two legal reasons why they could not proceed with a 
trial. But the Court did proceed— illegally. 
The record shows that this matter was referred by the assigned 
judge under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the presiding 
judge, Dec. 03, 1991. 
Judge Murphy's Order: 
...."that the matter is referred back to the assigned judge for 
resolution." 
This Order has still not been complied with. Therefore the 
proceedings have never been completed-- legally. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
CAN THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE LEGALLY PROCEED 
WHILE DISREGARDING THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDERE 
From the time that the Petitioner took control of her case, Pro se, 
after her attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdraw, she has devoted a large portion 
of the time contending with the Honorable John A. Roklch about his duty to 
abide wi th the Utah Code of Civil Procedure. Very l i t t l e time was taken, 
by the Court, covering the issues of the matters. 
The Plaint i f f 's discovery was never is not completed. 
The Respondent f i led a belated OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on Oct. 17, 1991. (Record 290): 
Defendant, through counsel, Glen M. Richardson, objects 
to the Request for Production of Documents submitted by 
Plaint i f f . Under the status of the matter, further discovery is 
not required and is not appropriate. 
Petitioner had fi led REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, June 
10,1991. Four months earlier. (Record 269) 
Further discovery was necessary and required for the 
Petitioner's case to proceed properly and to find what other property the 
Respondent might be hiding from her. 
Any cert i f icate of readiness for t r ia l which is served 
upon the opposing party and fi led with the clerk of the court in 
which discovery is not complete prior to f i l ing the cert i f icate 
or in which discovery is not complete prior to pretrial 
conference may be stricken and the tr ia l date, i f assigned, may 
be vacated. Rule 4-104 (5). Code of Judicial Administration. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
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This is one of the reasons the Petitioner did not appear at the 
November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing which can be found to be clearly 
erroneous, and should be vacated by this Court. She also believed that she 
would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rokich; the Record of that 
hearing proves she was right in her belief. 
The trial could not legally proceed until after the Presiding Judge 
had held a hearing on the issue of judicial bias. Petitioner's claims 
of judicial bias were not properly and appropriately determined 
before the evidentiary hearing as required under Rule 63(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Brief of Appellant, A-3.) 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the 
matter of disqualification of a judge: 
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that 
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing 
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge 
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like 
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit [Emphasis added]. 
Judge John A. Rokich did proceed further therein, before calling in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
TRANSCRIPT: 
The Court: And probably before you put on the testimony 
I think it would be better if we locate the file and put it in the 
record and you can come in some other time and take some 
testimony.. 
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Mr. Richman: Can we preserve the testimony today? 
The Court: Fine. That's Fine. You may. 
Mr. Richman: I would like to also put on the record what 
happened. (Transcript p. 11, line 7 to 15). 
The f i le could not be located because there was none from Judge 
Murphy. 
The November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing can be found to be clearly 
erroneous, and this was one reason why Petitioner did not appear. She 
also believed that she would not receive a fair t r ia l before Judge Rokich; 
the Record of this hearing proves she was right in her belief. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES JUDICIAL BIAS 
I I . 
The f i rs t error in law the Honorable John A. Rokich made was a 
biased and prejudiced Order for the Petitioner to move from her home in 
ten days, against her and the children's rights under Section 1, 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The Petitioner has found no law whereby a judge can legally issue 
such an Order. The Court gave no consideration to the circumstances of 
the Petitioner and the minor children; with the Respondent taking control 
of the bank accounts he had lef t the family destitute. 
TRANSCRIPT: 
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.) 
The Court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not 
where she's going to go. [Emphasis added]. 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Why haven't you moved out? 
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A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have any money 
to go anyplace. (Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13 &. A-52). [Emphasis 
added]. 
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can 
sort it out. I told you in the first instance I'm inclined to have 
her move out of the house: They haven't shown me any reason 
why she shouldn't be out. So, I'm not convinced that the fact 
that she hasn't any place to go is any reason that I should not 
enforce the order. So, you know— (Tr. p. 25, lines 16 -22 & 
A-54). [Emphasis added]. 
Had the court not prejudged and decided the issue before hearing the 
testimony, and was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony or 
weigh the circumstances as to what was fair and just? 
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v. 
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice 
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity 
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint 
of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have 
the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the 
courts.' Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this 
point when he wrote: 'One of the most important things in 
government is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall 
always be able to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all 
matters of litigation in the courts. It is nearly as important 
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity of the 
courts. I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the 
courts into disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case 
when one of the litigants believes that such judge is biased 
and prejudiced against him'." Marchant v. Merchant 743 P.2d 
199 (Utah App. 1987), 
The Court ordered Petitioner to move in the unreasonable time of ten 
days and finally presented an unfair dilemma to the Petitioner, "either 
move or else " 
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The Petitioner had offered to move if the Respondent gave her 
$3,000 to move with. This was not done, and was later determined, by the 
Court, along with some of the furniture, to be a stipulation of settlement. 
The Respondent had offered an interest in their thrift plan but the 
Honorable John A. Rokich said in camera, of the $3,000, "That is all you're 
going to get." 
Although the Respondent had agreed that any money additions 
accrued to his retirement during the marriage of the parties should be 
divided equally between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
The Petitioner sold the home on H Street, of which the parties were 
joint tenants, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118.000). 
She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000) 
each. But, with pressure from the Court she could not wait longer for the 
right buyer. The potential loss was over Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000). 
Nothing was said about selling another home, at 5685 South 3650 
West, Bennion, where James was living on his U.P Corporation Pension 
Plan retirement of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars and 72 Cents 
($3,095.72) per month. This home is still owned by both parties as joint 
tenants. And issue that still needs settlement. 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERROR REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE 
III. 
When Rita was unable to leave their home, as she had no money to 
make the move, Mr. Spafford withdraw from her case. 
In a letter to Rita, dated July 19, 1990, he stated: 
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"I cannot endorse your decision to defy the Court 
Order, This alone is a basis for Withdrawal." 
The Petitioner's Attorney, Mr. Spafford, should have appealed this 
illegal Order at that point, and protected his client instead of 
withdrawing. The appeal at this time could have saved his client much 
time, money and heartache. 
From this point on, the Court and the Attorney for the Respondent 
committed illegal acts which caused the proceedings to be il legal. 
It is the illegal acts which are addressed in these arguments as a 
question of law. 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IV. 
Petitioner feels that this Court has misconstrued or overlooked 
statutes and decisions which have affected the result, or that they have 
based the decision on some wrong principle of the law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which materially affects the result. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce as determination by the Trial Court 
was clearly erroneous. 
THIS PETITION IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT AS 
THE PETITIONER AND THE CHILDREN HAVE BEEN 
DEPRIVED OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS THAT IS LEGALLY 
THEIRS 
V. 
This appeal is not frivolous and without merit. 
The Petitioner and the children have been deprived of thousands of 
dollars worth of property that is legally theirs. 
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If the parties had settled all disputed issues properly and fairly 
according to the laws of Utah, as they should have been, then there would 
have been no appeal of the verdict. 
There are many matters that should have been properly and legally 
tried and resolved in the Trial Court. 
ALIMONY: 
In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are 
duty bound to consider the financial condition and needs of the 
spouse requesting alimony, the ability of that spouse to 
produce sufficient income for herself or himself and the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide support to the 
requesting spouse. (Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Jones v. 
Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 
325 (Utah App. 1987); and Schindlerv. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah App. 1989). 
As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson. 704 
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985): 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
CHILDREN: 
Divorce courts are deemed to have broad equitable powers in 
safeguarding the interests and welfare of children and the 
decree and orders in a divorce proceeding are of a different and 
higher character than judgments in an action of law. Barrett v. 
Barrett 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d 1. (Utah 1965). 
PROPERTY: 
In a Washington case Lynn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App. 
171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated: 
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Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding 
required to award all separate property to the party acquiring 
it or to divide community property equally, the court does not 
have unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment. 
RCWA 26.08-1 10. 
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy. In the Arizona 
case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 1 12 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975). it 
is stated: 
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial 
court in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318. 
ATTORNEY FEES: 
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband. 752 
P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-3 that on remand the Trial Court 
should also determine the Appellant's need for Respondent's 
payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the appeal and that 
if a financial need were adequately shown that the Trial Court 
could take evidence regarding a reasonable fee in making such 
an order pursuant to that statute. 
PENSION: 
A pension being considered as marital property 
(Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), a portion 
of Respondent's monthly pension benefits should be considered 
as an entitlement of Appellant. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Woodward v. 
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), specifically held, citing an earlier 
case of Englert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1978) as follows: 
. . . We emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing 
with the family, pointing out that the court may take into 
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. These 
circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such 
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pension fund or insurance", id , at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may l imi t the abil i ty of the court to 
consider all of the parties' assets and circumstances, 
including retirement and pension rights, i t is expressly 
overruled. 
SHOULD NOT THIS CASE HAVE BEEN AGAIN REMANDED TO 
TRIAL COURT WHERE IT COULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY AND 
LEGALLY TRIED AND RESOLVED BEFORE A FAIR JUDGE 
VI . 
In the f i rs t Appeal, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration: 
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support the court's finding *17 regarding costs and fees and 
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briggs v. 
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v. 
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those 
issues. If, having decided those issues, the court determines 
some adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution 
is in order, the court has the discretion to make such 
adjustments." 
Is not the above the least consideration the Petitioner should 
receive? 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Honorable John A. Rokich did not abide by the law as 
required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-104 
(5). Code of Judicial Administration. (Amended effective January 15, 
1990.), or fol low the Order of the the Court of Appeals, Petitioner did not 
receive her due process of law as protected by the Constitution of Utah,. 
Art icle 1, Section 7. 
Petitioner also feels that in the second appeal the Court of Appeals 
misconstrued or overlooked the above statutes and other decisions which 
14 
have affected the result, or that they have based the decision on some 
wrong principle of the law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result. Should not the Decree of 
Divorce have been declared null and void by the Court of Appeals? 
The Petitioner was entitled to due process of law and a fair trial as 
described in 88 CJ.S. 36, 91 , 92 and 93. 
A new trial should be based at the very least on the May 23, 1991 
Order in the Utah Court of Appeals; which was not properly considered by 
the Trial Court. 
The Petitioner respectfully prays that because the Court of Appeals' 
decision on a proper Decree of Divorce incorrectly decided an important 
question of state law, establishes bad public policy and conflicts with 
controlling Utah statutes and prior decisions of this Court, this Court 
should grant the Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
that decision. 
DATED this 12. day of September, 1993 
2zLz. / 
Rita C. Gum, Pro Se 
Attorney for Petitioner 
(Original signature) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing petition for Writ of Certiorari were served upon the 
Defendant/Respondent by hand-delivering same to the following counsel of 
record on this LL . day of September, 1993: 
GLEN M. RICHMAN, ESQ. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant - Respondent 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)532-8844 
^ _V^^x 
Rita C. Gum 
(Original signature) 
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MAY 2 3 1991 
ORDER 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Rita C. Gum, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James Richard Gum, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ary T. Noonan 
Clerk of tht Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900528-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). 
Based on the evidence in the record and, in particular, 
plaintiff's concessions as set forth in the document she filed 
with the court styled by her a supplemental complaint, we 
affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding 
alimony, child support, the grounds for granting the divorce, 
and the real property and sale proceeds. 
However 
support the 
the court's 
v. HolcQmfr/ 
Birch, 771 
Accordingly 
If, having 
adjustment 
order, the 
the record contains insufficient evidence to 
court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and 
finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briaas 
740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v. 
P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
we remand for reconsideration of those issues, 
decided those issues, the court determines some 
to other aspects of the property distribution is in 
court has the discretion to make such adjustments. 
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991. 
ALL CONCUR 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
7~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of May, 1991, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered or 
deposited in the United States mail. 
Rita C. Gum 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Glen M. Richman 
Attorney at Law 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Craig E. Ludwig 
Clerk of the Court 
Salt Lake Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Third District Court Judge 
240 East 400 South, Room 401 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991. 
DeDutv /clerk 
UtahCw^
 t repeals 
UN 2 1 i:S3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS yCLk/i' .<&, 
0 0 O 0 0 . - . , -,.,,rt 
ORDER 
Case No. 920164-CA 
Rita C. Gum, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James Richard Gum, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme (Rule 31). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. 
Dated this ,^1 day of June, 1993. 
<^^^^^^c^^^d^^ 
N6rman H. Ja^fcfson, J u d g e 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gr£gory x K^Qfme , J u d g e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of June, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Rita C. Gum 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Glen M. Richman 
Richman & Richman 
Attorneys at Law 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Salt Lake Third District Court Trial Ct. No. D90-4901065 
Attn: Alice Wong 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Third District Court Judge 
240 East 400 South, Room 401 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 21st day of June, 1993. 
, / i • 
Deputy// Clerk 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Rita C. Gum, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James Richard Gum, 
Defendant and Aooellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 0 1993 
• / • Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 920164-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed July 7, 1993, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 20th day of July, 1993 
FOR THE COURT: 
y 
-^v.mii, Lg&<a-
Mary T./Noonan 
Clerk\/f the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of July, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
was deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed 
below: 
Rita C. Gum 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Glen M. Ricbjnan 
Richman & Richman 
Attorneys at Law 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dated this 20th day of July, 1993. 
a ^ By 0///l/ ///f^£^ 
Deputy Cledrk 
m t 5 1993 
RITA C. GUM, v . JAMES RICHARD GUM, _ ^ „ , , ~i inocMC PAIIQT 
Case Name: \ P.U=RKSUPREMEOUUH1 
UTAH 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an extension of time be given to 
the petitioner, Rita C. Gum , for the 
preparation and filing of petition for a writ of certiorari up to and 
including September 18, 1993 . 
DATED this 13th day of August , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Sit^Q. *• 
JUSTICE 
